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ANÁLISE DO ENVOLVIMENTO DOS CONSELHOS DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO NA 
GESTÃO ESTRATÉGICA 
 
RESUMO 
 
Este estudo analisa o envolvimento dos conselhos de administração na gestão estratégica. A partir 
de um levantamento com 36 empresas brasileiras afiliadas com o Instituto Brasileiro de Governança 
Corporativa, foram analisados os fatores que determinam o grau de envolvimento dos conselheiros 
nas decisões estratégicas. Foram abordadas três dimensões: quais decisões estão sob a 
responsabilidade do conselho; quais critérios determinam o grau ótimo de envolvimento do 
conselho; e em que medida os conselhos centralizam as decisões estratégicas. Os resultados 
mostraram que os conselhos estão aumentando seu envolvimento em diferentes tipos de decisões 
estratégicas, não se limitando a monitorar e controlar a empresa. Além disso, eles buscam um 
equilíbrio ao centralizar a autoridade, dividindo decisões importantes com a alta administração e 
agindo no processo de aconselhamento. 
 
Palavras-chave: Estratégia; Conselho de administração; Gestão estratégica 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS' INVOLVEMENT  IN STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyzes the involvement of boards of directors in strategic management. Through a 
survey of 36 Brazilian companies affiliated with the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance, 
we intend to analyze the factors that determine the degree of involvement of boards of directors in 
strategic decisions. Three dimensions were focused: which strategic decisions are under the boards' 
responsibility; which criteria are used to determine the optimum involvement of the board; and to 
what degree boards centralize strategic decisions. Results showed that boards are increasing their 
involvement in different types of strategic decisions, not limiting themselves to monitoring and 
controlling the company. Also, boards will tend to reach a balance when it comes to centralization 
of authority, sharing decisions with top managers and acting like counselors in the strategic 
management process. 
 
Key words: Strategy; Boards of directors; Corporate governance  
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ANÁLISIS DE LA RELACIÓN DE LOS CONSEJOS DE ADMINISTRACIÓN CON LA 
GESTIÓN  ESTRATÉGICA 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Este estudio analiza la relación de los consejos de administración con la gestión estratégica. A partir 
de un levantamiento con 36 empresas brasileñas afiliadas con el Instituto Brasileño de Gobernanza 
Corporativa, fueron analizados los factores que determinan el grado de relación de los consejeros en 
las decisiones estratégicas. Fueron abordadas tres dimensiones: cuáles decisiones están bajo la 
responsabilidad del consejo; cuáles criterios determinan el grado óptimo de relación del consejo; y 
en qué medida los consejos centralizan las decisiones estratégicas. Los resultados mostraron que los 
consejos están aumentando su relación en diferentes tipos de decisiones estratégicas, no limitándose 
solamente a monitorear y controlar la empresa. Además, los mismos buscan un equilibrio al 
centralizar la autoridad, dividiendo las decisiones importantes con la alta administración y con 
actuación en el proceso de aconsejamiento. 
 
Palabras clave: Estrategia; Consejo de administración; Gestión estratégica. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This study presents an analysis of the involvement of boards of directors in their companies' 
strategic decisions. This subject has gained importance for two main reasons: the attention that has 
been given to the role of boards of directors lately owing to corporate governance demands and the 
silence in the literature about their involvement in the strategic management process – a subject 
often studied in relation to top management level. 
Traditionally, the board of directors is the organ responsible for representing the owners of a 
company. Lately, it has also been considered the organ responsible for assuring that the company is 
acting in a transparent way towards investors, in a legally correct, ethical and sustainable manner. 
After the 90’s, several corporate scandals brought the role of the boards to attention; the term 
“corporate governance” began to be used as synonymous with ethics and transparency. Thus, 
boards became more actively involved in the strategic management of their companies. 
Several issues have influenced boards of directors’ role lately, such as globalization, new forms of 
competition and new types of business and technologies; this has led many modern companies to 
review the role of their boardrooms (Ingley & Van Der Walt, 2001; Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Li 
& Harrison, 2008). Those issues also led to increasing pressure from investors, creditors and 
shareholders in a bid to ensure effective corporate governance of their investments (Schmidt & 
Brauer, 2006). Meanwhile, several studies began to reveal higher degrees of boards' involvement in 
the strategy of their organizations, as means to achieve superior performance (Mc Donnald, 
Westphal & Graebner, 2008; Wu, 2008).  
However, studies on how the board gets involved in strategic management are still rare in 
the literature (Brauer & Schmidt, 2007). In academia, many studies have focused on the role and 
composition of the boards, especially in relation to financial performance. (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand 
& Johnson, 1998; Ong & Wan, 2008; Rehbein, 2008).  
The level of a board of directors' involvement in strategic decisions can be viewed either as 
an institutional response or as a strategic adaptation to external pressures for greater board 
involvement. Higher involvement has been shown to be positively related to financial performance 
(Judge & Zeithaml, 1992), while it may not be adding the value that organizations expect to gain 
from the boards' involvement (Bart, 2004). 
The delicate relationship between company owners and managers has been extensively 
studied, but not always from a strategic management perspective. Some companies, such as Enron, 
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had problems with fraud and corruption involving directors, something that was widely publicized 
in the nineties. These episodes not only affected company owners, but also society, with loss of jobs 
and unpaid debts to workers, which ultimately had an impact on the social environment in which 
the company operated. 
Research initiatives on the role of boards of directors have suffered from several 
shortcomings: lack of an overall theoretical perspective, reliance on proxies to play the strategy role 
rather than direct action and a lack of quantitative data (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). Also, while effective 
corporate strategies are the major route to create shareholder value on a consistent basis (Keenan, 
2004), research has been directed mostly towards evaluation of the board’s demographics 
(composition and profile of members) as well as control mechanisms.   
Boards' role in strategy has not been clearly defined theoretically, and it has also been 
subject to many changes in the latest years. While in the seventies and eighties boards were usually 
seen as the organs ultimately responsible for either approving or disapproving top managers’ 
decisions (Herman, 1981; Pfeffer, 1972), the situation has begun to change recently.  
Recent developments argue that boards should extrapolate their roles in order to improve 
strategic development (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Stringer, 2006; Nightngale, Numerof & Abrams, 
2006) instead of performing the traditional duties of controlling and monitoring the company. While 
boards of directors are usually recognized as having the potential to affect strategic change in 
companies, whether such potential is typically realized is a matter of considerable debate (Golden & 
Zajac, 2001).  
Those are the reasons that justify this study. Although studies about the role of boards in 
strategy are recent, it remains unclear how boards should become involved in their companies’ 
strategy (Stringer, 2006). 
Therefore, the key point in this research is: 
What determines the degree of involvement of boards of directors in strategic decisions? 
This research question will be analyzed in three dimensions. First, which strategic decisions 
are under the role of the board of directors? Second, what are the criteria that determine a higher or 
lower level of board involvement in strategic decisions? Third, to what extent do boards of directors 
decentralize strategic decisions to the top management? 
The core of this research is a quantitative study carried out on 36 boards of companies 
affiliated to the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC). This Institute is a reference as 
regards the best practices in this subject; therefore, companies affiliated to it tend to show greater 
concern for the role their boards of directors should play. 
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In the following sections, we will present an overview of the theory used to develop the 
hypothesis of this study, followed by the methodological procedures and the analysis and discussion 
of the results.  
 
 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
 
Strategic management is defined, in this study, as appropriately adapting, integrating and 
reconfiguring internal and external organizational skills, resources and functional competences to 
match the requirements of a changing environment (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1999). We chose to 
study strategic management from the perspective of the strategic decisions of the company. 
Therefore, we understand strategic decisions as those that have greater impact and influence on the 
direction of the company, and are the key attributes of strategic management.  
In this study, three dimensions were chosen to verify the involvement of the boards in 
strategic management. The first dimension is the types of strategic decisions that are within the 
scope of the work of boards of directors. The second one attempts to analyze the main reasons that 
determine a higher or lower level of involvement of the board in strategic decisions. Finally, the 
third dimension deals with the degree of centralization of authority of the boards.  
 
2.1 STRATEGIC DECISIONS WITH HIGHER LEVELS OF INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
BOARD 
 
Andrade and Rosseti (1999) consider that the function of the board of directors is not 
restricted to controlling the company’s financial performance; it is their function also to propose 
strategies, monitor strategy implementation and approve decisions taken by the CEO, although in 
the past they were viewed as passive agents who tended to control financial measures (Tashakori & 
Boulton, 1983).  
Birchfield (2003) argues that board composition, as a trend for the future, will undergo four 
major changes: the age of the members will tend to fall, there will be an increase in the presence of 
women in the board, the board members' skills will come into focus and their compensation will 
increase. 
Despite the studies that indicate an expansion of the role of the boards to a managerial and 
strategic level, there are authors that limit their role to a controlling function. To Donaldson (2001), 
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boards should not invade the managerial field – they should get involved in strategic management 
only when one of the following situations happens: (1) retirement of the CEO, (2) sharp decline in 
profitability and (3) attempts to take control of the company. Salmon (2001) takes an intermediate 
position. He argues that shareholders should not claim that the Board manage the business, but he 
expects the board to be involved in long term planning. 
Lodi (1988) lists seven strategic variables that are largely responsible for the future of a 
venture and should therefore be discussed by the boards. They should get involved in the discussion 
of policies, products, customers and consumers, distribution and promotion, competitive 
advantages, prices, finance and investments. Nadler (2004) adds the following 
decisions/assignments to the list of the board’s responsibilities: CEO’s performance assessment, 
guaranteeing the effectiveness of audit procedures, keeping track of investments, giving opinions to 
top managers and approving mergers and acquisitions. 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) categorize a board’s approach to strategy according to two 
constructs: strategic control and financial control. The extent to which either construct is favored 
depends on contextual factors such as board power, environmental uncertainty and information 
asymmetry. 
Bart (2004) found out that while boards receive and discuss all sorts of ‘strategic 
information’, there is no question that, currently, financial measures are deominant. This latter issue 
received the highest ratings in the information and discussion scores. But financial information is 
probably the least valuable component of a board member’s strategic information requirements. In 
his study, most boards claimed to be quite involved already in their organization’s strategy 
formulation process. Another of his findings is that boards affirmed they need to spend much more 
time on their organization’s corporate strategy. 
Given the decisions often assigned to boards, according to the literature, it appears that 
boards tend to get more involved in financial decisions than in other aspects. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 1: Boards of directors get more involved with financial than with managerial 
decisions in their companies. 
This hypothesis implies that, among the several decisions usually associated with the role of the 
boards, they will tend to be more involved with the ones with financial implications.  
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2.2 CRITERIA FOR DEFINING THE BOARD’S LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT IN 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 
The level of involvement of boards can vary in different instances. First, it can vary  
according to the relative importance of various decisions to strategy management. That was the 
focus of the first hypothesis. It can also vary from company to company, with regard to   strategic 
decisions in general. This is the focus of the second and third hypotheses of the study. 
One of the aspects to consider is what leads boards to determine a higher or lower level of 
involvement in strategic management. Higher involvement means that top managers will have less 
authority to make that decision; therefore this can be defined as centralization. The theory of 
centralization and decentralization is formed by a combination of traditional studies that are not 
often used in relation to boards of directors. However, it may hold some important clues as to the 
criteria that must be used when deciding on the degree of the boards' involvement (Lacombe & 
Heilborn, 2003).  
Centralization is often associated with certain situations (Cury, 2000): 1) pressures arising 
from the internal and external environment, and business progress (whereby, in a period of 
expansion of the company, as well as reduced competition, it may be appropriate to start 
decentralizing); 2) size and structure of company, in the sense that, in larger companies, the most 
important decisions should remain centralized; 3) policy direction and attitude of the head of the 
company, as well as the nature of the various functions to be delegated; 4) need for standardization; 
5) risks involved. The leader's personal characteristics can also contribute towards the decision to 
centralize and to let subordinates play a greater or lesser role in the decision- making process 
(D'Estaing, 1973). As to the influence of the external environment (Koontz and O'Donnel, 1964), a 
more unstable and threatening environment should promote greater centralization.  
Conger, Finagold and Lawler III (2001) argue that boards of directors must have the 
knowledge, information, power, experience, motivation and time to carry out work that is effective 
and consistent with the strategic demands. 
As to the study of these issues from the board’s perspective, theory is rather sparse. In the light of 
the traditional theory of centralization of authority, our second hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 2: The main criterion for establishing the boards’ involvement in strategy 
management is the board member's capabilities to deal with those issues. 
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This hypothesis implies that, considering a list of criteria derived from the literature, the 
board’s involvement in strategic management will be higher when they are more qualified to take 
these decisions.  
 
2.3 BOARD’S LEVEL OF INVOLVEMENT IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 
While the second hypothesis deals with the criteria for centralization, this third block 
explores the existence of different degrees of centralization of authority. Considering all strategic 
decisions, boards of different companies could centralize their strategic decisions to a higher or 
lesser degree. Centralizing means that boards would take some strategic decisions alone, without 
delegating authority to the top management. The level of a board of directors’ involvement in 
strategic decisions can vary according to board sizes, their diversification and organizational age 
(Judge Jr. & Zeithaml, 1992).  
Pearce and Zahra (1991) integrated several typologies of CEO-Board power relations, and came 
up with a model of four types of boards, which also appeared in other studies they considered 
(Vance, 1968; Aram & Cowen, 1983; Molz, 1985; Wood, 1983 and Hermann, 1987). These types 
reflect the composition of the boards, their characteristics, internal processes and decision-making 
styles. The four types are: 
 
• Caretaker: with low board power and low CEO power, this type of board is viewed as a 
legal necessity and therefore is incapable of commanding decision-making power. 
• Statutory: they reflect the prototypical image of ineffective boards in the literature, as a 
powerful CEO is the central figure in the organizational decision-making but the board is 
still considered a legal necessity. 
• Proactive: this type of board has much more power than the previous types and is a true 
instrument of corporate governance. They usually command powers that surpass those of the 
CEO. 
• Participative: are characterized by discussion, debate and disagreement, as the differences of 
opinion are resolved by vote, a majority vote prevailing.  
• Pearce and Zahra's study (1991) was one of the most important backgrounds for this study 
with regard to the third hypothesis. However, their focus is on the role played by the board 
on the organizational level – especially whether the board plays a central role in the 
company or not. We chose to analyze a more administrative role - which may depend on the 
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personality of directors, their interaction as a group (the focus of Adams & Ferreira, 2007). 
Therefore, we chose to examine the degree to which the board centralizes strategic decisions 
instead of decentralizing them. So, the third hypothesis of the study is: 
Hypothesis 3: Boards of directors tend to strike a balance between centralizing strategic 
decisions and decentralizing them to top managers. 
Given the lack of a measure of the centralization of decisions, we chose to define seven levels of 
centralization of authority, which are:   
 
1. Board does not participate in decisions concerning the company's strategy. 
2. Board follows up the results of Top Managers' decisions. 
3. Board only approves or disapproves decisions taken by Top Managers. 
4. Board and Top Managers share strategic decisions. 
5. Board takes all the strategic decisions, consulting with Top Managers. 
6. Board takes all the strategic decisions and informs Top Managers so that they can 
implement them. 
7. Board takes all the strategic decisions and also gets involved in the implementation 
of the strategy. 
 
Therefore, the third hypothesis states that, among these seven levels, boards of directors of 
companies affiliated with the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance will tend to choose the 
intermediate level, which is level 4, since they will want to combine the expertise and competencies 
of board members and top managers. 
 
 
3 METHODS 
 
This was a quantitative survey with board members of companies affiliated with the 
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC). The universe of professionals who are 
affiliated to IBGC comprises 600 individuals from various companies, acting as chairmen, 
presidents and holding other board positions. We chose a random sample of 6% of valid responses, 
which corresponds to 36 respondents. Those respondents were from different companies; that 
means that this survey represents the reality of the boards of 36 different companies in Brazil.   
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The data collection instrument consisted of closed and open questions and was divided into 
three parts, as are the hypotheses of the study:  
 
1) Decisions under the authority of the board of directors. Measures for this derived from Brazilian 
Institute of Corporate Governance Standards. These are found in a document detailing best 
practices for board members, where we can find decisions that should be under their authority, 
such as: deciding on financial policies, approving mergers and acquisitions, taking action and 
adopting measures of reaction to competition, making decisions on new products and taking 
other decisions that are listed in Table 1. We have also used the work of Lodi (2000), Salmon 
(2001) and Bart (2004) as a basis. The scale adopted was a grade from 1 to 5 according to the 
board's level of involvement in each of the strategic decisions made. 
2) Criteria for defining the level of involvement of the board. The measurements for data 
collection for this came from the studies of Cury (2000) and Mills (1996) but underwent major 
changes during the phase of in-depth interviews with directors.  
3) Level of involvement of the board in strategic decisions: the measures for this group came from 
the studies of Hendry and Kiel (2004) and Pearce and Zahra (1991), but they were modified to 
reflect the seven levels of centralization that were previously presented. Respondents were 
asked to choose one of the seven possible options.  
 
The data collection instrument went through a pre-test with researchers in the field; 10 board 
members were interviewed. 
Data collection was carried out by inviting participants by e-mail. The questionnaire was made 
available on a Web page. The responses were automatically stored in a database - this procedure 
enables the researcher to have greater control over the answers, reducing typing errors. Several 
precautions were also taken in relation to technological resources - the webpage did not allow, for 
example, respondents' answers to be sent incomplete or out of the pattern. Data were analyzed using 
descriptive statistics. 
 
 
4 RESULTS 
 
The sample of 36 participants consisted of directors, chairmen or other members of the 
board. Most of the respondents were male (89%) and over 45 years of age. Most of them have been 
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in the current position for over a year or more (78%). Companies are large and medium businesses 
(89%), of various sectors (7 companies dealt in metal and steel, 6 sold energy; 8 companies offer 
various services, 3 produce fabrics, 3 are in the technology sector, 3 are transportation companies, 2 
sell food and cosmetics and 2 companies are industries with a variety of products). 
First, we showed the respondents a list of possible decisions that could be under the 
authority of the board. They were asked to assign a grade from 1 to 5 according to the degree of 
board involvement in that specific decision. We also gave the respondents the choice to answer "not 
applicable". These responses were not considered valid for the calculation of the mean and standard 
deviation of each variable.  
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the variables. 
 
Table 1 - Decisions under the authority of the Boards of Directors 
Top 10 decisions under the authority of the Boards of Directors Mean S.Dev N/A 
1 Approving mergers and acquisitions 4.50 1.24 24 
2 Deciding on significant expansion of the company 4.41 0.94 19 
3 Deciding on capital investment plans 4.35 0.81 16 
4 Deciding on strategic alliances 4.00 1.12 16 
5 Deciding on compensation for CEO and top managers 4.00 1.30 22 
6 Hiring and dismissing directors and CEO 3.93 1.28 21 
7 Deciding on financial policies 3.81 0.92 9 
8 Deciding on investments in technological innovations 3.73 1.05 6 
9 Changes in the company in the face of macro-events 3.44 1.58 18 
10 Decision about reaching a new market or not 3.31 1.41 10 
N=36 
 
 
Analyzing only the means and standard deviations, the decisions with the most significant 
degree of board participation were the ones that have implications for the expansion of the 
company. This was the case with “approval of mergers and acquisitions” (mean= 4.5) and 
“significant expansion of the company” (mean=4.41). The third decision with greater board 
involvement was “capital investment planning” (mean=4.35). 
Results confirm the first hypothesis of this study, which was:  
Hypothesis 1: Boards of directors get more involved with financial than with managerial 
decisions in their companies 
We could see that the boards of directors in this sample still get more involved with  
financial than with managerial decisions in their companies, despite the fact that much of the 
literature points to a more significant managerial approach on the part of the boards (Andrade e 
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Rossetti, 1999; Lodi,2000). This result indicates that, while boards have the responsibility of 
monitoring and evaluating financial measures, they could also be missing opportunities to use their 
experience as board members to ensure that the company is choosing the best strategic paths.  
In the second part of the study, participants were asked to indicate the criteria used in the 
company to determine which decisions should be under the authority of the board. We showed them 
a list of criteria (see  
Table 2) which they should grade from 1 to 5, according to the use of that criterion in their 
company. Thus, the higher the grade, the greater is the use of a criterion.  
 
Table 2 - Criteria for defining the level of involvement of the board 
Top 10 criteria for definition of optimum involvement level Mean S.Dev. N/A 
1 The decision has a great impact on the company's operations 4.20 1.24 20 
2 The board is technically competent to take the decision 3.77 1.15 22 
3 The rules are written down in the statute of the board 3.43 1.50 23 
4 Decisions have long- term impact 3.37 1.28 27 
5 There are periods of crisis in business 3.31 1.00 29 
6 The external environment is turbulent 3.14 1.01 28 
7 There is a high level of uncertainty concerning important decisions 3.00 1.34 30 
8 It improves the relationship between the board and top managers 2.96 1.34 25 
9 The decision does not need to be taken quickly 2.26 1.06 31 
10 Avoid overloading board members 1.97 1.13 33 
N=36 
 
Table 2 provides the mean and standard deviation for the variables. Looking at the average, 
we can see that the criteria with the higher means are: The decision has a great impact on the 
company's operations (mean=4.20); Board is technically competent to take the decision 
(mean=3.77); Board decisions are listed in their statute (mean=3.43) and The decisions have long 
term impacts (mean=3.37). 
The least used criteria were: “improvement of the relationship between the top managers and 
board” and “avoid overloading the board members”. Overloading decision makers was one of the 
criteria quoted by Castro (1994) and Cury (2000) as important, as that could decrease the quality of 
the decisions taken.  
There is not enough evidence to confirm the second hypothesis of the study, which was: 
Hypothesis 2: The main criterion for establishing the boards’ involvement in strategy 
management is the board member's capabilities to deal with those issues. 
Therefore, it can be verified that greater impact on the company was the main criterion 
adopted by those companies to determine the board’s involvement in strategic decisions. However, 
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the second most used criterion was the technical competence of the board. This result points to 
better use of the board’s competences to advise top managers in the strategic issues. Brauer and 
Schmidt (2007) suggest that board involvement in strategy implementation should be continuous 
rather than sporadic, meaning that board involvement should not be prompted by the departure of a 
CEO or a major crisis. Instead, boards should continuously probe and monitor the firm's resource 
allocation processes in order to help an organization adapt to environmental changes. 
Finally, the third part of the survey dealt with the analysis of the board’s level of 
involvement in strategic decisions. They should select one of the seven options provided, previously 
explained, to rate their companies.  
Results showed that, in our sample, no companies were classified in the extremes (levels 1 and 7). 
Most of the companies were ranked in the level 4 category, which shows there is a partnership 
involving the board and the top managers in decision making. It is interesting to note that the 
number of companies decreases as we move towards the extreme levels. This  shows that in our 
sample companies tend to concentrate in the levels of best balance between centralization and 
decentralization.  
 
  Figure 1 shows a graph with the number of companies in each level. We can note that the 
results are close to normal distribution, where 16 companies are ranked at level 4, while 8 and 7 
companies respectively are at levels 3 and 5, followed by a smaller number of companies at levels 2 
and 6. 
 
  Figure 1 - Board’s level of involvement in the strategic decisions 
Variables Number 
cases 
% 
 
1 Level 1 0 0% 
2 Level 2 3 8% 
3 Level 3 8 22% 
4 Level 4 16 44% 
5 Level 5 7 19% 
6 Level 6 2 6% 
7 Level 7 0 0% 
N=36 
 
As we can see in the previous results, the third hypothesis of this study was confirmed:  
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Hypothesis 3: Boards of directors tend to strike a balance between centralizing strategic 
decisions and decentralizing them to top managers. 
The acceptance of this hypothesis implies that the boards of those companies tend to share 
decisions with top managers without either extreme centralization – which could lead to inefficient 
decisions taken by board members – or extreme decentralization – which could lead to lack of 
control. 
 
 
5 VERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
 
The theory about the involvement of boards in strategic management recommends, in 
general, that boards should exercise their authority in decisions with greater impact on the 
organization. They should therefore decentralize operational decisions and the implementation of 
strategies. The survey results showed that most of the companies in this sample followed these 
recommendations. It is important to remember that this sample was taken from a universe of 
companies that tend to follow corporate governance guidelines, since they are affiliated to the 
Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance. As to decisions in which boards are usually more 
involved, we could observe that expansion of the organization is one of the issues that demands 
more active participation of the boards in this sample. This result is in line with the theory that 
states that boards should get involved in decisions with greater impact.  
In the comparison with a similar research carried out in the United States by Korn / Ferry 
(Lameira, 1963), already exploited in the theoretical framework, we could confirm  that the boards 
of these companies in Brazil and the boards of companies in the USA that took part in that survey 
tend to be more deeply involved in strategic decisions, a new role of the board of directors. 
Some of the seven issues that boards should pay attention to, according to Lodi (1988), ranked high  
in terms of board involvement in this sample. As to the issues proposed by the author, results 
showed that the boards get more involved in three of them than in the others: competitive advantage 
(strategic alliances, mean=4.0, and mergers and acquisitions, mean=4.5), capital investment plans 
(mean=4.35) and financial policies (mean=3.81).  
Four other decisions from this list of seven had lower rankings in comparison to other decisions. 
They were product policies (mean=2.97); customers and consumer policy (mean=2.73); product 
promotion and distribution policies (mean=2.44) and price policy (mean=2.53). 
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When we analyze which criteria are adopted to decide when the board will be involved in 
strategic decisions, results show that the impact of the decision and the long-term effects are d the 
main criteria in these companies. This result is aligned with the propositions of the theory of 
centralization (Castro, 1994; Cury, 2000).  It implies that, whenever a decision has a greater impact 
on the organization and whenever it has long-term effects, there will be  greater involvement of the 
board in that decision. 
Another important finding is that boards of directors tend to follow what is stated in their 
statutes when it comes to determining their level of involvement in strategic management. 
Therefore, statutes should receive more attention since they tend to be followed. It is important to 
establish a statute that is consistent with the best governance practices. 
As to the level of involvement of the board in strategic decisions, the balance between 
centralization and decentralization is an ideal sought by most organizations. This balance is also 
recommended by most of the centralization and decentralization theories.  
The analysis of the data led to the proposition of a theoretical model that can help 
understand and analyze the levels of involvement of boards in strategic management. In this model, 
we used the results of the survey to group the cases and then we could note that companies tend to 
search for the balance that is indicated at level 4.  
 
      Figure 2 illustrates that movement with arrows. We also named each of the levels 
according to the behavior of the board. 
 
      Figure 2 - Model for the analysis of the board’s level of involvement in the strategic decisions 
 
 
 
4 
3 5 
2 6 
1 7 
BALANCE 
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Centralized 
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The levels shown in the above model, ranging from 1 to 7, refer to the level of centralization 
of authority by the board, which can vary from greater decentralization, where the board does not 
participate in decision-making, to a situation where even operational decisions are centralized at 
board level.  
In level 7, for example, the Board is not only responsible for most decisions, but also for 
implementing them. In level 4 – the one that is named balance – boards tend to share authority and 
responsibility with top managers and act as partners in the management of strategies. 
We can see in  
 
      Figure 2 that the higher the number assigned, the more centralized decisions are. 
However, increased centralization is not necessarily a better choice, because as the involvement 
increases, the board often becomes operational and this can bring problems to the company, slowing 
the decision – making process without making it better.  
The number of companies represented in the results increases as you move towards  a 
situation of balance (level 4), in which the board centralizes some decisions, and decentralizes 
others, while maintaining partnership with top managers. These results are aligned with 
propositions by many authors, who argue that the board should act as a consultant body that 
effectively contributes to better decision making in the organization. 
The results obtained in this research show that, among the companies that participated in the survey, 
there is a greater concentration of companies at level 4 -- the balance. 
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study proposes to analyze board involvement with the aid of a previously presented 
theoretical model. We have reached the conclusion that most company boards really get involved 
with strategic management, contrary to the typical assignment of the “controller” board. Some of 
them even centralize decisions that, according to most theoretical approaches, should be assigned to 
top managers.  
As to decisions under the authority of the board, the results showed that the boards in this 
sample tended to centralize authority in decisions with major impact on the company, such as 
mergers and acquisitions. Although the level of participation of the board was considered high, this 
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is not common to most companies and therefore there was a high number of "not applicable" 
responses.  
Other decisions that are commonly assigned to the boards are those related to control 
functions. Decisions concerning financial aspects occupied the second position in terms of 
participants' mean notes. As financial aspects are closely linked to aspects of control in the 
organization, such decisions are usually assigned to the board. 
Finally as to the level of involvement of the board in strategic management, companies showed that 
they seek a balance between centralization and decentralization of decisions. This could be 
demonstrated by the spontaneous choice of one of seven levels of board involvement. The cases of 
companies that are in one of the extremes (1, 2, 6 and 7) are very few. In the interviews, 
respondents also mentioned this quest for a better balance. 
This research has some limitations, such as its exploratory nature, since the size of the 
sample does not permit generalization. There is also the possibility of different interpretations of 
some of the questions among respondents, since the instrument was not entirely validated by 
previous studies. On the other hand, this study is innovative, since similar studies do not exist, to 
the best of our knowledge. We tried to minimize the limitations with in-depth interviews that were 
conducted before quantitative data were collected. The literature on boards' authority still needs 
more development, so this study could not be compared to previous ones. 
We suggest that further research on the role of the board in strategic management should be 
carried out, especially with regard to stages of the strategic management process. Results suggested 
that boards tend to get more involved in the formulation stages, although we could not find enough 
information to confirm that; this, therefore, could be a suggestion for future studies. Another aspect 
noticed in the course of this study is that boards in family owned companies may have different 
characteristics, so we also suggest further investigation into this subject.  
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